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The last eight years have witnessed a steadily growing body
of literature concerning a particular oranch of welfare
economlcs which emphasises the material and energy balance
aspect of the production-consumption cycle. (1)
As long as it was possible to ignore the class of externalities
associated with resource depletion and residuals disposal from
production and consumption processes, the economic system
could well do without this extra complication.
It is now quite evident, however, that increasing economic
development with rising industrial and population concentrations
lS causing certain threshold values of environmental acceptance
of man's ｡ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ｩ ｴ ｩ ･ ｾ to be surpassed.
As far as production and consumption are concerned the environ-
ment has two basic attributes: the ability to supply the
resources and the ability to absorb the residuals. The philosophy
behind a mass and energy balance approach is the reduction of
the production and consumption waste flows of Figure la to the
1. See for example R.D. Ayres and A.V. Kneese, Production,
Consumption and ｅ ｸ ｴ ･ ｲ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｳ Ｌ Am. Econ. Rev., 59, 282,
(1969); A. V. Kneese, Environmenta·l ·Pollution: EConomics
ｾ ｴ ｩ ､ ｐ ｾ ｬ ｩ ｾ ｹ Ｌ Am. Econ. Rev., (Papers Proc.) 61, 153, (1971)
F"Igure ｾ
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to the greatest extent possible. (2) In the hypothetical
limiting case when the waste flows are reduced to zero (Figure
lb), the mass and energy balance is perfect; all materials and
energy that enter from the environment, remain in the production-
consumption cycle. Such a system has no waste and therefore
no pollution. This situation can never be achieved even in
theory however, insofar as it contradicts the third law of
thermodynamics which is perfectly obeyed because of the
essentially chemical and physical nature of the systems involved.
In this paper we shall be concerned principally with the problem
of waste-minimisation in the production ｰ ｲ ｯ ｾ ･ ｳ ｳ Ｎ Ｈ Ｓ Ｉ We shall
not be concerned with the technological aspect which tends to
consider waste-minimisation as an isolated problem relative to
a particular process or processes, (4) but rather ｾ ｩ ｴ ｨ the
2. An important distinction must be made between the low entropy
raw-materials extracted from the environment and the high
entropy wastes given back. Although matter is not lost, it
requires much more energy to retrieve after it has been
dispersed into the environment.
3. In reality materials waste is as big a problem if not a bigger
problem in the consumption process. To the extent that
possible waste materials and energy flows between production
and consumption are many and heterogeneous, a decomposition
of the total system into production and consumption is only
a zero-order approach to the total problem. Any results
coming from such a partial systems study can have only limited
validity. However, insofar as materials and energy balance
are concerned, production and consumption differ basically
only in the generally much longer time constants of the
consumption process. Bearing this in mind a total systems
discussion could be basically an extention of the present one.
4. For example minimising wastes in certain fine chemicals
industries by increasing the reaction yields, or energy
wastes by improving insulation.
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systems aspect which considers waste minimisation relative to
an entire system of processes by highlighting on the possible
interrelations between all the processes and their wastes.
In recent times there has been much talk of aChieving waste
minimisation in the production process by means of novel waste-
minimising industrial complexes. (5)
A waste-minimising complex is ideally pictured as a collection
of production facilities in a localised region with every plant
feeding materials and energy that would otherwise have been
wasted to the ･ ｮ ｶ ｩ ｲ ｯ ｮ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ ｾ into plants which utilise them in
their production process. Cross-feeding is seen as having the
basic features of continuity in ｳ ｵ ｰ ｰ ｬ ｹ ｾ and reservoirs exist
between donor plants and receiver ｰ ｬ ｡ ｮ ｴ ｳ ｾ as well- as auxiliary
feeds to ensure against random ｢ ｲ ･ ｡ ｫ ､ ｯ ｷ ｮ ｾ maintenance shutdown
and staggered production set-up discontinuities.
The trouble with such a naive picture is not so much the network
flow control problem which is basically solved by using adequately
large ｲ ･ ｳ ･ ｲ ｶ ｯ ｩ ｲ ｳ ｾ nor is it the waste recovery problem. Amazing
advances have been made in recent years regarding technology of
separation of wastes with positive utilities from complex mixtures.
This is becoming so efficient as to be in many cases quite
5. See for example the discussions between IIASA and UNIDO.
6 .
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competitive on a cost or even profit basis with materials of
more traditional origin. Moreover not all of this has been
concerned with recovery for internal recycling. (6,7)
The real problem is how does one operatively define and then
design such a thing as a waste-minimising industrial complex?
The basic questions to be asked in the simplistic transition
indicated in Figure 2 are, how does one decide the identity of
the plants and plant processes and how does one decide their
capacity? Basically, how does one go from a wasteful polluting
configuration to a waste-minimising complex?
But also how does one define minimum? Are we going to minimise
as much as possible irrespective of what it might mean
for the demand-supply relation and to the whole production
spectrum? If we push the minimisation far enough and require
that all wastes become by-products in the transition, we could
well end up with a supply of products that was very strange
indeed, and probably not ideal to support a happy, thriving
population!
Production units are characterised by capacities and generally
P.G. Barnard, A.A. Cochran and L.C. George, ｒ ･ ｣ ｯ ｶ ･ ｲ ｾ of
Metallurgical Values from Industrial Wastes, Procee Ings of
the Second Mineral Waste Utilisation Symposium, Chicago,
March, 1970, p. 8.
7. The Electroplaters are Polishing uQ, Environmental Science
and Technology, 8 (5), 406, (1974).
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need to be spread out over large geographic areas simply
because consumption capacity tends to be, and relevant(8)
market regions are generally smaller than geo-political units.
Labour tends to be localised. Is it possible to distribute
different capacity plants to satisfy only waste-minimising
criteria? Clearly there are more objectives than just waste
minimisation.
A very simplistic approach might view the problem as static
and proceed by way of a total systems optimisation. The inputs
to such a programme would include all known production processes,
their utilities requirements, materials inputs and residuals,
process production functions as a function of plant capacity,
capital and operating costs, utility costs, transportation
structure,costs and pollution, location of raw extraction
materials, water availability, technological functions like
efficiency of steam transmission, capital availability, spatial
distribution of labour, permissible labour migration, relevant
market regions for all products and intermediates, a demand
spectrum, exports and imports and probably many others. The
output would include location of the complexes, capital and
labour requirements, local plant mix and respective capacities
8. See L.H. Klaassen Methods of Selctin Industries for
Depressed Areas, OECD, Paris, (19 7 , for an operational
definition of "relevant market region".
- 6 -
and by-products coupling between the plants. (9)
The objective function would probably have to be hierarchically
structured and such that the waste-minimising objective would
not necessarily even occupy the highest level in the hierarchy.
This is not to say that waste-minimising objective would
necessarily lose priority in such a system but clearly some
precedence may need to be given between minimising waste and
say unemployment or water consumption if these are antogonistic.
The objective function could have a trade-off rather than a
hierarchical character if this is deemed more ｡ ｰ ｰ ｲ ｯ ｰ ｲ ｩ ｡ ｴ ･ ｾ or
a mixture of the two. A hierarchical structure has the
advantage from the programming point of ｶ ｩ ･ ｷ ｾ that the dimension
of the problem can precipitate considerably if a large number
of possible alternatives are first filtered out by higher level
objectives.
It seems to me that this total approach is doomed to failure.
The reasons are many. Not only is it difficult to establish
higher-level objectives and their hierarchy in a non-equivocal
way or a trade-off structure for that ｭ ｡ ｴ ｴ ･ ｲ ｾ but even if a
total objective could be defined ｳ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｳ ｦ ｡ ｣ ｴ ｯ ｲ ｩ ｬ ｹ ｾ there is
9. This approach is not necessarily as fanciful as it may sound:
see for ･ ｸ ｡ ｭ ｰ ｬ ･ ｾ R. ａ ｹ ｲ ･ ｳ ｾ J. Saxton and M. ｓｴ･ｲｮｾ Materials-
Process-Product ｍ ｯ ､ ･ ｬ ｾ International Research and Technology
ｃ ｯ ｲ ｰ ｯ ｲ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ July 1974.
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practically no hope of a possible client endowed with
decision power, the planning agencies for example, ever
accepting it, The higher levels include social policy
objectives like minimising unemployment, economic policy
objectives, regional policy objectives and others, These
functions are generally taken care of by the political sector. (10)
It would clearly be unrealistic and foolardy to attempt to
dispossess the political element ln this type of study, the
results woul be meaningless even as general guidelines.
In principle a large scale static minimum waste complex has
a very long economic life time, much longer than time constants
for economic, technological and social change. (11) In view of
this a device which simply defines a static best set of ｩ ｮ ､ ｵ ｳ ｴ ｲ ｩ ･ ｾ
and by-products flows for a particular local situation generally
cannot be considered an acceptable solution. What is needed
is a flexible mechanism which can adapt to this frequency of
10. Some arrangement of this type cannot be avoided especially
in the short term if society is to remain adaptive. The
political element plays a very convenient role. It is
thanks to its taking on the task of solving the higher
level objectives that the dimensionality of the problem drops by
several orders of magnitude!
11. Since the constituent plants and plant units have different
life times, their replacement occurs in a staggered manner.
Replacement of a single production unit, however, has in
general only a marginal capital cost impact on the rest of
the complex. Replacements cannot in general respond to
exogenous changes in technology and demand for example
without affecting the minimum waste condition. As a
consequence the total complex has a much longer life-time
than any of the constituent plants and this increases
with the size of the complex.
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variations. A production structure that is too rigid can
end up by becoming rapidly obsolete in market economies and by
constraining patters of consumption in centrally planned
economies.
A static optimisation gives a solution for the complex which
is fixed from the beginning of construction to the end of its
days. In principle the complex cannot even begin to function
until it is all built and this could take an inordinately long
time. Apart from the large design, planning and organisational
problems involved there is a further one for market economies.
Here there is no certainty that industries would even be attracted
without such extreme incentives that the complex as a whole
loses its validity.
From a practical point of view it is difficult to even conceive
of an integrated industrial complex based on materials and
energy balance criteria as the result of a large scale planning
effort in a market economy. The basic reason for this lies
clearly in the antagonism between market economics and central
planning economics. However a static, highly integrated, mixed
industry complex working in unison has no place in a dynamic
world whether it be embedded in a market or a centrally planned
economy.
It seems to me that any serious study of the industrial complex
- 9 -
based on materials and energy balance criteria cannot limit
itself to defining the optimum industrial plant ｭ ｩ ｸ ｾ which
by the way could be optimal in any particular instant in both
types of ･ ｣ ｯ ｮ ｯ ｭ ｹ ｾ but must also concern itself with how such
a plant-mix could materialise and also react to keep pace with
changes in the outside world.
This is a much more delicate problem than that of designing
a particular optimum ｣ ｯ ｮ ｦ ｩ ｧ ｵ ｲ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ especially so in a market
economy where it is not sufficient to give guidelines upon which
planners may act but where market mechanisms must be escogitated
which will induce the type of solution ､ ･ ｳ ｩ ｲ ･ ､ ｾ one that 1S
not only waste-minimising but also ､ ｹ ｮ ｡ ｭ ｩ ｣ ｾ to happen in a
reasonably free way.
In this paper we shall be mostly concerned with the problem as
it exists in the context of market economies. In such systems
one is confronted with the added challenge of having to devise
strategies for inducing waste minimisation which guarantee the
essential nature of the market system even in the face of over-
all by-products integration between production sectors.
To talk of waste-minimising industrial complexes for market
economies clearly has only academic sense unless a ｲ･｡ｬｩｳｴｩ｣ｾ
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operative solution can be given to the attraction(12) problem,
which preserves the market system.
There is a particular case in market economies for which the
attraction problem does not exist and for which the total problem
collapses basically to the problem in centrally planned economies:
the definition and design of a dynamic optimum complex. This is
the case of the whole complex belonging to-a single enterprise,
under government-imposed total materials and energy waste
constraints.
There are examples even today of industrial complexes belonging
to one single enterprise which tend towards waste minimising
criteria. The ｬ ｡ ｲ ｾ ･ integrated steel plant with coking plant,
gasification plant, anmonia and benzol recovery" permanganate
recovery, slag-utilisation plants with sulphate and phosphate
fertiliser production, water and heat recvcling etc. is the
prime example. However they utilise only a small percentage of
12. This is not meant necessarily in the sense of attraction
to one location, although in final analysis it will partly
amount to this, but rather in the sense of attraction
between different plants due to a by-products generating
potential.
The waste-minimising industrial complex need not be envisaged
as a spatial agglomeration with small average inter-plant
distance. By-products attraction between production
facilities can be felt over considerable distances
according to value-to-weight ratios and transportation
costs. However the bulk of by-products have typically
low value-to-weight ratios. If moreover special legisla-
tion is enacted to curb transportation pollution the
waste-minimising industrial complex may well tend to spatial
agglomeration.
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the total waste Ｈ ｾ Ｓ Ｐ %by weight) and the effluent water
and gases need considerable treatment as can be seen from
Table 1 just for the coking plant. Furthermore the basic
reason for emphasis on by-products recovery has been profit-
maximising or cost-minimising rather than waste minimising.
Another mechanism that seems feasible in a market economy
is something akin to the classical industrial estate. The
objectives sought in establishing these estates in the past
have varied; private groups seeking to make a profit, local
and ｲ ･ ｾ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｡ ｬ authorities seeking advantages of economic and
social nature or government and private conglomerates seeking
to promote industrial development.
The criteria for deciding upon what type of industry to attract
have been entirely non-uniform and usually not very easy to
identify. Broadly speaking the industrial estate authority
was just interested in attracting industrial activity. This
it did by a number of mechanisms such as providing the buildings,
much of the auxiliary services, organising low cost utilities,
tax exemptions, low rentals, benefits of agglomerative nature
and a host of other incentives. In some cases a preference
for non-polluting industries was shown but waste-minimisation
criteria have never been used as a basis for attracting industry. (13)
13. See for example ,Es tab lishment aT Indus·trial Estates in
Underdeveloped Countries, United Nations, 1961; Industrial
Estates in Asia and the Far East, United Nations, 1962.
TABLE 1
POLLUTION FROM A COKING PLANT FOR A 10 MILLION
TON/YR STEEL PLANT (@)
Air pollution
Wat er pollution
coal and coke dust 14800 tonslyr
coke oven gas (§ ) 5200
sulphur dioxide 4700
hydrogen sulphide 900
phenols 960
aromatics ( § ) 1600
hydrogen cyanide 500
ammonia 1035
pyridine bases 100
suspended solids 73900
phenols 2439
ammonia (§) 29560
cyanides 100
thiocyanates 800
permanganates (§ ) 13300
@ From I.Codd,Pollution Control and the Iron and Steel
Industry,Third Interregional Symposium on the Iron and
Steel Industry,Brasilia,October 1973.
§ Presently recovered as byproduct.
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The waste minimising industrial complex would probably be
centred around some starting strategic industry like a steel
plant or a refinery or a pulp and paper mill, with high
material and energy wastes. Incentives for attracting industry
need not be very different from what they are in the classical
industrial estate. The basic innovation lies in the fact that
the complex authority would decide at least partly if not
principally, on the basis of waste-utilisation whether a particular
applying industry can or cannot locate.
It is however difficult to conceive of a purely selective action
that is effective in fostering cross-utilisation of wastes even
if supplemented by a canopy of benefits. Industry would probably
take exceedingly long time to locate or not locate at all. For
one thing the classical industrial estate has no 'built-in
incentive for by-products development. Incentives for attraction
would have to take the form of subsidies and an economy built
on subsidies is like a house made of cards.
As a means of persuasion or dissuasion some type of money-
commodity flow mechanism is necessary that takes into account
the new meaning that industrial wastes acquire 1n a materials
and energy balance oriented economy. One that readily comes
to mind if the authority 1S an arm of the government, is for
the authority to exact a waste and pollution tax from industries
in the complex until their waste is utilised either by already
- 13 -
existing facilities or by a new locating industry. Industry
is encouraged to locate by industrial complex benefits but
foremost by the prospect of being able to dispose of its
wastes in a profitable way in the future and by a lower than
market price for input materials that are otherwise waste out-
puts of other industries. (14)
For example a sulphur polluting industry like pyrites smelting
could attract sulphuric acid production by a lower than market
price for the sulphur equivalent set by the smelting industry
to maximise profit from sales or minimise loss due to develop-
ment and treatment. The smelting plant may even find it convenient
to install its own sulphuric acid plant. (15)
It is worth mentioning that another factor of attraction to
the type of waste minimising complex described is the fact
that new add-on plants need not work at classical economic
optimum capacity. The new rewards and penalty structure implied
14. Such a mechanism presupposes that waste and pollution are
taxed irrespective of where industry locates, whether it
be in a waste minimising complex or not.
Clearly investment in by-products development will be oriented
according to by-products markets and to aChieving a by-products
price that is not greater than the market price.
15 Something like this is already current in the Four-Corners
region of the United States. See for example, F.A. Ferguson,
K.T. Semran and D.R. Monti,S02 from Smelters, By-Products
Markets a Powerful Lure, Environmental Science and Technology,
4(7), 562 (1970)
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can well make small plants that are sUb-optimal in classical
economics, optimal from the point of view of the modern welfare
economics in question. The same clearly applies to production
processes; the best process is not necessarily the same in the
two types of economy.
In a market economy it is also conceivable to rely on the profit
motive to encourage creativity in the cross-utilisation of wastes.
One can imagine an industrial complex set up by a private group
with the characteristic that the complex authority would take
on all responsibility to the environment control authorities
for any waste emitted to the environment from the complex and
that the industries involved relinquish all claim to the wastes
they produce once they are located.
This may sound like suicide or an extreme form of masochism,
but one should not neglect the economies of scale associated
with waste treatment technology, which can corne about as a
result of concentrating wastes in the hands of one processor.
Waste heat is a clear example where dispersion of activities
lead to 10ss.(16) Chromium recovery from tannery effluents,
16. Before 1965 most sulphur acid production in Italy was
dispersed and not amenable to energy saving practices
such as recovery of waste heat. With more recent con-
centrated capacity Ｈ ｾ Ｖ Ｐ Ｐ Ｌ Ｐ Ｐ Ｐ tons / yr. in Follonica for
example) energy recovery in the form of medium pressure
stearn occurs to the extent of 500 MW equivalent.
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just to take one further example is presently profitable
only if large quantities of wastes are
treated. (17)
The complex authority powered by the profit motive, would take
on the task of waste treatment and by products development
and moreover would have discriminatory power over the type of
industry it allows to locate, rr.ainly with an eye to internal
consistency for the complex it is developing.
Evidence that a mechanism of this type may develop is forth-
coming from the large number of recycling and reclamation enter-
prises that mushroom(18) in the United States as industrial
and municipal wastes acquire a value. (19)
Clearly waste utilisation enterprises need not be associated
with particular locations and could exercise their activity
over the whole terrain. Low value-to-weight ratios for most
17. Private communication.
18. Names like The National Association of Secondary Material
Industries (1913), The National Slag Association (1918),
The National Institute of Scrap Iron and Steel (1928) and
The National Ash Association (1968) bear witness to historical
developments of this nature in the United States.
19. Examples of municipal wastes are much more publicised. See
for example, ｒ ･ ｦ ｵ ｳ ｾ Ｍ ｴ ｯ Ｍ ｅ ｮ ･ ｲ ｧ ｹ Plant Uses ｆ ｩ ｾ ｳ ｴ Von Roll
Incinerators in U.S., Environmental Science and Technology,(jun, 692, (1974); Plastics Resource RecoVery Dilemma,
Environmental Science and Technology, 1(10), 894, (1974).
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by-products and wastes however should favour a localised type
of development.
The dynamic element of the type of mechanisms described is
provided by the individual enterprises which would be free to
come and go as it suits their particular business objective,
h · h' . 1 '" f' t (20) mh t····w 1C 1S ma1n y max1m1s1ng pro 1 . ｾＮ e was e-m1n1m1s1ng
element is the responsibility of the complex planning agency
or group working under government legislation constraints which
would decide unpon detailed attraction strategies to minimise
total waste from the complex and maybe make a profit out of it.
Development is industry oriented insofar as it is based on a
core industry(21) and the complex would expand or contract 1n
a step-by-step manner. Clearly this solution is ,sub-optimal at
any given instant of time, but it is quite likely to be close
to the desired dynamic optimum over a suffjciently long time
horizon.
Ayres and Kneese(l) have given a convincing argument that the
type of partial equilibrium iteration implied in the industrial
complex step-by-step growth described, converges towards the
general equilibrium or total systems solution. However it
20. This type of objective responds well to economic, social
and technological variations.
21. This is not necessary but practical.
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should be noted that the general equilibrium is very much a
dynamic equilibrium and with staggered construction and develop-
ment lag-time in the order of years, the question of convergence
or no convergence is really quite academic.
Both the single enterprise and the industrial estate presuppose
a basic spatial location and a supervisory structure to orient
and organise location. They are moreover only particular cases
of a more general mechanism which involves the whole economy and
is therefore basically not location oriented. I am referring
to the possibility of inducing waste minimisation in the economy
as a whole by the effective use of normative legislation which
puts a price on the use of the environment. Insofar as the
environment is becoming a scarce commodity, the economic
argument goes, it is inevitable to attach a price on its use
and the only possible custodian of the environment is the govern-
ment.
Such a solution preserves the essence of the market system and
is therefore dynamic as well as waste-minimising. Furthermore
it would not require special planning authorities as govern-
ment sponsored industrial estates imply, although some central
organ would be necessary to investigate and set the best price on
the environment.
It is worth while emphasising that the other two mechanisms
- 18 -
described are perfectly compatible with this mechanism. Both
single-enterprise and estate-type waste-minimising complexes
would be well-defined and cohabit in an economy in which use
of the environment was priced. Furthermore, although localised
waste-minimising complexes are not a prerequisite of a minimum
waste economy, it is quite likely that a sufficiently aggressive
environmental pricing system could induce a shift to an economy
based essentially on localised industrial complex nodes of the
waste-minimising type with minimal by-products transportation.
The point to be made here is that in such a system localised
minimum-waste complexes might develop irrespective of the
. t f th . t . t . the locat l" on. (22 )eXlS ence 0 au orl les 0 superVlse
Pricing the use of the environment is in itself a complicated
mechanism to put into practice, basically because the environ-
ment is very extensive and requires an extensive custodian
mechanism with high operating and capital costs(23), but
also because it is an extremely large and difficult systems
problem to decide on the right price to put on all the different
aspects of the environment in order to achieve overall waste-
22. See for example footnote 11 and also footnote 22.
23. The high cost of the extensiveness of a custodian mechanis.m
largely devolved upon industry as a function of its
dispersion, could also be a factor in favouring the growth
of localised waste-minimising complexes.
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minimisation, assuming this is the objective.
How should the environment be priced? This question is crucial
to the whole idea.of the waste minimising economy and of the
waste-minimising complex for that matter, because no waste-
minimisation will ever be forthcoming unless use of the environ-
ment is priced and priced correctly. With this in mind, a
feasibility study of the waste-minimising complex is equivalent
to the study of alternative environmental pricing pOlicies which
will foster its growth.
A material and energy balance ideal would require pricing the
use of the environment irrespective of whether the pollutant or
waste was dispersed or separated out in an apparently harmless
form and then dumped or stockpiled.
Especially high social costs can be associated with stockpiling
and dumping of bulky wastes such as slag from steel plants or
fly ash from coal fired power plants. At present only a small
percentage(24) of these wastes are finding a use as can be seen
from Table 2. The colliery spoil stockpile in Great Britain
has reached 3 x 109 tons. Of this the National Coal Board
24. In Great Britain essentially all 9 x 106 tons/yr. of
blast furnace slag are being utilised as roadstone, rail-
way ballast, aggregate for concrete, fertiliser and
cement manufacture (see footnote 25). However this
situation is atypical.
TABLE 2
(a) SLAG SOLD IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1968 (lOCO short tons) (@)
Use Blast furnace Steel
total slag sold 28744
total slag produced 41742
portland cement concrete .
bituminous concrete pavements .
concrete masonry block .
railroad ballast .
bases for cement and bituminous
concrete .
cement manufacture .
roofing slag (cover and granules) .
mineral wool .
agricultural slag .
glass .
sewage trickling filter medium .
anti-skid and ice control .
paths,driveways and parking areas .
fill .
miscellaneous .
3381
3910
1833
4223
11199
1131
519
416
61
181
24
107
40
1461
258
479
792
4379
85
93
54
70
258
6210
18486
(b) PRODUCTION AND UTILISATION OF ASH IN THE UNITED STATES ( $)
Year Production Utilisation Utilisation
millions of tons %
1955 15 0.3 2.0
1965 25 1.3 5.2
1966 25.2 3.1 12.0
1967 27.5 3.8 13.8
1968 29.6 5.2 17.9
1969 33.4 5.3 16.2
@ From H.K.Eggleston,The Successful Utilisation of Iron and
Steel Slags,Proceedings of the Second Mineral Waste
Utilisation Symposium,Chicago,March 1970,p.15.
$ From J.H.Faber and P.G.Meikle,Ash Utilisation Techniques
Present and Future,Proceedings of the Second Mineral Waste
Utilisation Symposium,Chicago,March 1970,p.24.
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spoils alone cover an area of 110 sq. km. at an average
height of about 15 m. Presently only about 7 x 106 tons are
used per year, which is considerably less than annual produc-
tion. (25) Colliery spoil has great potential in concrete
manufacture among other uses. A hefty penalty for colliery
spoil dumping would probably encourage development for aggregate
use especially if adequately coupled with penalties for
extracting aggregate from the environment. There is probably
enough aggregate in the form of colliery spoils in Great Britain
to satisfy all demand at least until the year 2000. (26)
The basic point behind the rationale implied in this type of
argument is that a price is put on the extraction of materials
from the environment that industry does not use in the production
process. Environmental pricing based on this rationale en-
courages technology advances in the cross-utilisation of wastes,
rather thatn technology advances in the elimination of pollu-
tion, as it is fuzzily called. If industry has to pay a price
25. W. Gutt, The Use of By-Products in Con'crete, Resources
Policy, September 1974, p.29.
26. Positive systems repercussions of waste minimising pOlicies
can be be illustrated by reference to bulk wastes such as
colliery spoils that can be used as building materials.
If an effective penalty-reward mechanism was enforced that
could encourage deVelopment of bulk wastes for construction
purposes rather than the present trend in expensive and
luxurious but not very efficient building materials, part
of the net result would be a 30 %decrease in space heating
and cooling requirements. See Panorama, no. 445, October
31, 1974.
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for wastes irrespective of what it does with them, then it
will react by using them in the way that involves the highest
returns or the least cost, which means developing a use for them.
At present industry' is more worried about eliminating pollution
than finding an economic use for wastes. Treatment plants are
not infrequently more polluting than the pollution they are
trying to eliminate in that more often than not they do not
provide an economic use for the separated residues. At present
most treatment plants convert a pollution problem into a waste
dumping problem. In a broad economic setting they are usually
extremely wasteful in materials and technology which is diverted
from concentrating on by-products development.
At present environmental legislation generally takes the form
of a standards structure. It is highly debatable that this is
better than a penalty structure which prices the environment
according to the amount of waste actually dispersed or dumped.
In a penalty system based on the quantity of pollution each
plant is taxed according to the amount it pollutes and is
therefore encouraged to find its own lowest cost pollution.
With a standards system every plant is forced below a threshold
regardless of its size and the extent it pollutes. This can
involve the loss of considerable degrees of decisionlmaking
freedom.
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The environmental control cost seems to be considerably higher
and the control more difficult to implement for a standards
based structure. SOlow(27) mentions the advantages of
decentralised decision making and the economising on information
inherent in a penalty-based structure. Moreover there is no
built-in money flow to defray the costs of an emission standards
control. The costing is basically through the public taxation
system and thus the onus rests directly on the public sector
rather than on the industrial intermediary. In fact in final
analysis the pUblic sector is taxed twice; first for the environ-
mental control costs and second for the increased costs of
production due to expensive waste-treatment.
On the other hand a pricing system based on the quantity of
waste actually emitted has a built-in circular goods and
money flows. The penalty money or price for using the environ-
ment which should depend on the fate of the wastes, can be
used to help defray the costs of the environmental control
mechanism. (28)
27. R.M. Solow, The Economist's Approach to Pollution and Its
Control, Science, 173, 498, (971).
28. It only helps to defray the costs because income from
this source tends to zero as the waste-minimising condition
is approached. However, at least the initial impetus for
financing the control mechanism would come directly from
the industrial sector rather than from the pUblic sector.
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If society decides on a standards structure at all costs, there
remains the problem of deciding on the minimum standards. At
the moment this is done in an extremely fuzzy was. A study in
which the basic objective is expressly inducing waste-minisa-
tion, and for which the penalty input is based on a standards
structure would at least help obtain a well-defined strategic
set of standards!
To what extent is it possible to reduce wastes and pollutants
from production processes in a constructive way? This depends
largely on the demand for products but fundamentally on by-
products technology and the penalty structure of the environ-
mental pricing system. There is a lingering suspicion that
adequate legislation, partly by boosting developments in by-
products technology and partly by changing the whole cost
structure of materials, would make the production sector far'
less wasteful than it presently is without any basic impact
on the demand-supply equilibrium.
Some very coarse estimates of the allocative cost of not
pricing the environment indicate for the United States some-
thing in the order of 30 billion dollars per year or about
5 % of GNP(l). This is to be compared with the 0.01 %(29)
29. D. Schwartzman, The Burden of Monopoly, J. Pol. Econ.,
68, 627, (1960).
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and 0.07 %(3 0 ) estimates of the welfare cost of monopoly.
In order to answer these questions it is necessary to study the
effect of alternative environmental pricing pOlicies on real
systems under pertinent technological scenarios. It is not
only a question of what is the best mechanism, but also one of
what are the best penalty functions to achieve the desired
effect?
Considerable modelling activity, basically simulation oriented,
is already under way which investigates the effect of different
types of pollution penalties on production costs and production
spectra. However none of this takes into any account whatever
the possibility of waste cross-utilisation. The studies are
directed at forecasting increases in production cost(31) and
possible changes in production processes(32). This seems to
be a very short-sighted way of ｡ ｰ ｰ ｲ ｯ ｡ ｣ ｨ ｩ ｮ ｾ the problem. It
cannot be seriously maintained that industry will stop at
installing extremely costly treatment equipment and let the
matter end with an increase in production costs or a change
30. A.C. Harberger, Monopoly and ｒ ･ ｳ ｾ ｵ ｾ ｣ ･ ｳ ａ ｬ ｬ ｯ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｌ Am.
Econ., Rev., Proc., 44, 77, (954).
31. R.M. Thrall and R.G. Thompson, Industrial Economic Models
of Water Use and Waste ｔ ｲ ･ ｡ ｴ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ ｾ Proceeding of the Joint
Automatic Control Conference, Austin, 1974; J.A. Callaway,
A.K. Schwarz and R.G. Thompson, Industrial Economic Model of Watel
Use and Waste Treatment for Ammonia, Water Resources
Research, 10 (4), 650, (1974).
32. See reference to footnote 9.
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In production process!
Both of these effects may be important in the short-term
especially if dead-lines for achieving minimum standard effluent
discharge are imposed as in the Federal Pollution Control Acts.
But in the longer term and not necessarily much longer term,
industry will react by finding new profitable uses for its
pollutants and wastes. (33)
Any modelling effort that ､ ｯ ･ ｾ not take into account the
adaptive nature of industry can only give a distorted view of
what is the best pollution penalty structure, which'is basically
what these models are trying to do.
The results of any modelling activity are extremely sensitive
to the technological variable as it concerns by-products develop-
33. Every other article in Environmental Science ｡ ｾ ､ Technology
is about advances in the use of industrial wastes.
It is interesting to witness how rapidly some industries can
react under pressure from local and regional government
authorities. Most of the ferric sulphate wastes (red mud)
from the production of titanium dioxide that was being
dumped off the coast of Corsica at a complete loss also to
the Corsican fishing ｩ ｮ ､ ｵ ｳ ｴ ｲ ｹ ｾ ｣ ｡ ｮ in fact be used at a
profit as barium and strontium ferrate magnetites for
electronic components parts. Previously the magnetites
were either imported into Italy or made from scrap iron,
which ｴ ｾ ｮ ､ ･ ｲ the circumstances is more profitably recycled
to steel plants. The technology jump has not exceedingly
great and all it needed was just a push from local authotities.
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ments. For example the amount of sulphur oxide wastes from
non-ferrous smelters, from coal and oil-fired power-plants and
from sour refinery gases is sufficient to quite swamp the
world market for sulphur products: mainly sulphuric acid,
elemental sulphur, liquid sulphur dioxide and the ammonium
sulphates. Unfortunately by-products development ln this
field is severely limited by the low cost of sulphur from the
Frasch process and the very low ｶ ｡ ｬ ｵ ･ Ｍ ｴ ｯ Ｍ ｷ ｾ ｩ ｧ ｨ ｾ ratios for
sulphur products which is reflected in the small size of the
market regions. Still it can be foreseen that if an advanced
technology is eventually developed for pure sulphur recovery
at low cost, and people are working very hard at it(3 4 ), then
the Frasch process may be all but forgotten for the next twenty
years at very least.
It would be useful to have some basic standard with which to
compare the effect on the economy of different environmental
policies. A basic standard could be a zero-order solution to
the minimum waste economy. This would involve considering
all materials in the same environmental light whether they be
inputs to the production process or outputs. All input and
output materials associated with each production process would
ideally cover the whole spectrum of available materials. For
example all the different sulphur grade coals would be different
materials. The ｯ ｵ ｾ ｰ ｵ ｴ materials of each process would include
34. See reference to footnote 15.
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main ｰ ｲ ｯ ､ ｵ ｣ ｴ ｳ ｾ by-products and wastes. The programming
problem would be determining the production processes and
I
associated throughputs to minimise total waste in the economy
as a ｷｨｯｬ･ｾ subject to demand for products constraints and a
materials input-output matrix constraints for each production
process.
The level of aggregation of such a ｳｴｵ､ｹｾ the whole ･ ｣ ｯ ｮ ｯ ｭ ｹ ｾ
warrants the use of fairly highly aggregated materials and
process ｩ ｮ ｰ ｵ ｴ ｳ ｾ and one could probably get away with using 2 or
3 digit SIC aggregation.
This solution is zero-order in that it neglects ｣ ｯ ｳ ｴ ｳ ｾ spatial
disaggregat ion of productive forces ｾ scale of produc tion ｾ in
fact everything except waste-minimisation objectives. If not
operatively useful it does nevertheless provide a picture of
what the production sectors could look like under different
technological scenarios in an aggressively waste-minimising
economy. It is "the impossible solution" but one that can
be fruitfully used for comparison purposes. It roughly
corresponds to maximum pricing of the environment.
A first order solution would involve introducing costs to
industry of pricing the environment. In this case alternative
environmental pricing ｰ ｯ ｬ ｩ ｣ ｩ ･ ｳ ｾ each associated with environmental
costs of extracting material from the environment and of dumping
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wastes into the environment would be involved as inputs to the
programme. The programme in this case would minimise total
cost to industry(35) rather than total waste from industry. The
same level of aggregation can be used as in the zero-order
solution.
The results from this programme can be used to evaluate the
different environmental pricing policies from the point of
view of approaching the minimum waste condition. In other
words what pricing policy corresponds to the minimum total
waste? Unlike the zero-order solution this type of programme
is non-linear and perhaps difficult to solve if unfortunate
penalty functions are chosen for pricing the environment.
Both zero order and first order solutions are static and
disregard some very important variables associated with the
real world such as scale of production and the fact that the
economy has spatial characteristics. They can however be used
to make more credible estimates of the allocative cost of not
pricing the environment that are at present available.
A second order static solution which disaggregates the economy
into regions may not have much real meaning since different
35. This would include also normal production cost as well as
environmental cost.
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products have different market regions. If an intelligent
criterion for disaggregation can be found a second order solu-
tion could be attempted with the different regions minimising
environmental costs independently.
One would then probably have to jump to a high order fine solu-
tion such as stochastic simulation study of industrial growth
in a national economy, under different environmental pricing
policies. In order to minimise the dimensionality of the problem,
this can be either an idealised economy with a limited number
of possible industrial locations or a real world situation for
a country in which the number of actual industrial regions was
small.
I would like to emphasise that such a simulation.study does
not have to be a computer programme. It would certainly involve
a computer interface to take care of all routine calculations.
On the other hand a many-player non-zero sum game must preserve
the human judgemental element which cannot be left to the computer
except by assuming improbably simple human behavioural mechanisms.
The simulation would have to take the form of a game somewhRt
reminiscent of Monopoly but clearly much more complicated.
Actions would be taken through a terminal and the scenario of
industrial growth would be available on video and computer
printouts.
- 30 -
The game would be played over the whole terrain with the players
free to locate in the different allowed industrial regions as
they please, sUbject to their own personal business objective of
making as much profit as possible. The time discretisation
would be in the order of a month or so and the real-time scaling
about I to 3000, with the players being allowed to pass if they
don't intend to invest.
The players would each represent a different production sector
so that they could specialise but their interests could be more
highly fragmented if more players and sufficient terminals are
available. They would ideally not be in contact with one another
except through a common data base which would be updated upon
every move of a player with adequate deterministic or stochastic
time lags.(36 )
The data base would include all information necessary for
assessing the opportunity of investment either in research and
development in by-products technology or in production facilities.
It would include exogenous variables such as forecast demand for
products over the time horizon and price elasticity, investment
and operating costs as a function of plant capacity, local and
regional constraints such as maximum water availability and
labour, location of raw material, transportation costs of materials,
36. Construction time and by-products research and development
time, for example.
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time and investment dependence of the probability of success
of research and development in different by-products technologies
as a function of by-products production costs, (37) and of course
also the environmental penalty functions. It would also include
endogenous variables such as industries located in the different
regions and waste flows, by-products available with quantities
and costs, production processes and cost estimates as a function
of plant capacity, and others.
In order to minimise the time necessary to make venture assess-
ments, an information retrieval system would be avilable with
standard routines to calculate all useful economic indeces.
The individual players might be interested in total supply of a
particular product, total estimated demand three years later,
materials costs in different industrial regions and quantity
available at different costs, (38) optimum plant size at particular
locations, investment cost, production cost, profit and loss
estimates, payback time and discounted cash flow, just to mention
a few.
37. These would probably be the most difficult inputs to forecast
and would require very expert treatment. It is largely
because of this fundamental variable that the time horizon
for a study of this nature would have to be limited to
about 10 years at very most.
38. This is especially important if the material is a by-product
insofar as the material flow is generally limited by the
production capacity of the output plant.
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The game would start with each player picking a starting
industry out of a hat and choosing the best location and optimum
capacity for it on the basis of the information available in
the data base.
Over time plants would open, others would close, some would be
sold, by-products technologies would be developed, (39) some
players would drop out of business altogether, others would
stay on as is normal in a market system.
Somewhere in the entrails of the computer an integrator would
be totally up all wastes and all extraction over the simulation
horizon. These would be compared for different environmetal
pricing policies including a no-pricing policy. After averaging
over many games of this type played with a glven environmental
pricing mechqnism, an allocative gain can be estimated for
every individual pricing policy relative to the no-pricing policy.
Rationale behind environmental legislation is still very confused.
The basic reason for this is that the benefits of different types
of legislation are very difficnlt to estimate. The involvement
of legislation in pollution and the environment has been generally
concerned with the health aspect. This is probably only a minor
39. If not,all players would quickly go out of business because
of the high environmental costs. The environmental pricing
has to be such that it is not profitable to be in business
without investing in extensive cross-utilisation of wastes.
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part of a very complicated systems problem and one furthermore,
for which experimental data is incomplete, contradictory and
difficult to obtain.
More data is available for the effect on flora and fauna but
the analysis of the whole ecosystem is in such a state of infancy
that it may not be the best approach to solving an urgent problem.
Environmental legislation whether we like it or not, it a steering
mechanism and as such it must be steering us somewhere. Presumably
what society basically wants is to maintain the ecosystem as
stable as possible through time. If this is the case then it
will have to be much more subtle than it presently is.
Waste minimisation is not a total panacea to this problem
insofar as the stability of the ecosystem depends also on
demographic and economic growth. However a mechanism that
favours the minimisation of wastes in the production and consump-
tion processes is also a mechanism that alters the state of
ecosystems as little as possible, at least to the extent
allowed by economic and demographic growth.
In this sense it is a good rationale for environmental legisla-
tion.
